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5.1  Introduction 
This paper explores a kind  of  “minimum  framework”  with which 
the role of banks, and particularly their welfare implications, can be 
examined. This topic of study is of undoubtedly great importance for 
modern economies, given the worldwide tendency to pursue relatively 
free banking, a phenomenon that has been unfolding perhaps more in 
response to the increase in the inflation rate of the leading currencies 
over the past  decade-more  by  “economic necessity,”  as it were- 
than in response to the thoughtful design of influential economists (see, 
however, McKinnon  1973, Sargent and Wallace 1981). 
The need to develop criteria to judge the different responses is par- 
ticularly  salient in countries in which the movement toward  a freer 
banking system has been associated with serious economic disruptions; 
examples of these are Argentina and Chile in recent years (see Diaz- 
Alejandro 1985). The relationship here is not necessarily one of cause 
and effect, but the fact that the two events went together represents 
for all  practical  purposes a  political  indictment  of free banking.  An 
unwinding of this road, if at all desirable, will therefore require a deep 
and persuasive intellectual effort. 
The investigation that follows is based on a small-country, overlapping- 
generations model in which the monetary authority announces a par- 
ticular path for the exchange rate. Since the analysis concentrates on 
steady states, the rate of devaluation will be closely related to the rate 
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of inflation. Thus, the first research question asked is what is the optimal 
rate of  inflation in the absence of  banks, where the criterion of  opti- 
mality is the population’s steady-state expected utility at birth.  Con- 
trary to models examining identical individuals, like the ones empha- 
sized in Friedman (1969), the model employed here shows that when 
there are no distortions in the capital market, the optimal rate of infla- 
tion is zero, and, more significantly (because of the greater robustness 
of the finding), that as a general rule there is no presumption that the 
optimal nominal interest rate be equal to zero (the condition of “full 
liquidity”). This latter result is obtained even when the existence of 
lump-sum taxes and subsidies, as in Friedman (1969), is allowed. 
The model presented here is such that if  there were no money to 
speak of, it would be optimal to allow for free international capital 
mobility. Thus, a natural question is whether the introduction of money 
implies some optimal intervention in the capital market if the authority 
could simultaneously control the rate of inflation. The answer is, again, 
in  the negative:  the optimum is attained with  no control on capital 
mobility and zero inflation. 
The next step in the analysis is to introduce banks as intermediaries 
that can issue deposits, hold cash, and buy securities. The banks are 
assumed competitive but may be subject to a minimum cash/deposits 
ratio. Again, the nonintervention, zero inflation results appear in this 
case. In addition, the results show that a lowering of the cash/deposits 
ratio is always welfare  improving if  capital mobility is perfect  and 
inflation is set at its optimal level. Whether such a movement toward 
banking liberalization is welfare-enhancing in the presence of distor- 
tions is less clear; however, the analysis does indicate that when cash 
and deposits are perfect substitutes and the government is constrained 
to collect a given amount of revenue using distortionary taxation, a 
lower cash/deposit ratio is welfare increasing, despite the fact that as 
a general rule it will call for a larger, and permanent, rate of inflation. 
The discussion so far is covered in more detail in section 5.2 and in 
the appendix.  Section 5.3 examines some extensions of  the model, 
such as imperfect subtitutability between cash and bank deposits and 
the existence of  nontradable goods. The ‘‘liberal’’ message is, on the 
whole,  sustained, although  it has to be  qualified in  the presence  of 
government revenue constraints  and imperfect  cash-deposits substi- 
tutability. The section also contains a brief description of the underlying 
microeconomics of banking. 
The above scenarios are very “open” in the sense that trade in both 
goods and securities is allowed. Up to this point in the paper, however, 
the implicit assumption is that foreigners have no interest in the small 
country’s “money,”  and neither does that country in theirs. This as- 
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money is assumed to exist. The reason for emphasizing this aspect of 
the currencies markets-and  not, for instance, the demand for foreign 
money by domestic  residents-is  the perception in  countries having 
problems associated with a banking liberalization process that the latter 
are partly related to the high volatility of “foreign”  funds, originally 
attracted  by the relatively high interest rates on domestic bank deposits. 
The presence of a foreign demand for domestic money or deposits 
may call for a drastic departure from the optimum of the currency- 
isolated economy; this is shown to be particularly the case if, in order 
to attract foreign funds for this purpose, the central bank is obliged to 
acquire highly liquid assets as some kind of insurance against, say, a 
run against the domestic currency. Optimal intervention may require 
making home deposits much less attractive than under the optimum in 
the currency-isolated  economy. But the analysis presented here also 
shows that to the extent that cash and deposits are perfect substitutes, 
it is always welfare improving to lower the cashheserve ratio and to 
increase the rate of inflation. In this sense, therefore, the presence of 
foreigners in the domestic currency market does not necessarily call 
for a tighter control on the banking system. 
Section 5.4 closes with a discussion of alternative ways to reduce 
the cost of attracting foreign funds. Following the summary in section 
5.5, the appendix presents another way of proving the first-best opti- 
mality  propositions  of  the text and  some discussion  of the optimal 
inflation (rate of devaluation) problem. 
5.2  Inflation and Banks in Deterministic Steady State 
This section will explore some of the simple economics of optimal 
inflation and banking in the context of an overlapping-generations model. 
I will confine my attention to deterministic steady states. Furthermore, 
to minimize the confounding effects of phenomena that would be ex- 
traneous to the discussion, I will assume that net taxes are given back 
to the public in the form of lump-sum subsidies. 
Consider an economy in which the residents live for two periods in 
a paradisaic steady state with constant population. Assume that, except 
for their  date of birth,  all residents are alike. Also assume that this 
economy is floating along in molecular oblivion, surrounded by a sea 
of other countries all producing the same output, where the law of large 
numbers dictates a constant one-period (international) rate of interest, 
r’ . 
As a warm-up exercise let us first examine the nonmonetary equi- 
librium. The typical consumer’s utility function is indicated by  U(c’, 
c*),  where ci(i =  1, 2) denotes consumption when young and old, re- 
spectively. Marginal utilities are positive, and U(.,  .) is strictly quasi- 180  Guillermo A. Calvo 
concave. Let b denote the output value of bonds held by  residents, 
and let r indicate the domestic real interest rate. Assume that the central 
authorities are in a position to create a wedge between r and r*.  But 
since, as indicated above, these authorities  are assumed to consume 
nothing by themselves, we postulate that: 
(1)  (r’ - r)b = g, 
where g is government lump-sum transfers to the private sector (mea- 
sured in terms of  output.) In words, equation (1) states that the dif- 
ference between the international and domestic values of the service 
account (of the balance of payments), is given back to the public in 
the form of lump-sum transfers. 
Let us consider, in particular, the case in which g is given to the old; 
and  to  economize on  notation, also assume that  there is.only one 
individual in each generation. The budget constraints of that individual 
are defined as follows: 
(2)  y’  = c1 + b 
(3)  y2 + b(l + r) + g  = c2. 
Equation (2)  simply states that income in period 1, y’,  is to be allocated 
between consumption in period  1 and the bond; equation (21, on the 
other hand, states that output in period 2, y2,  plus the gross revenue 
from the bond, h(l + r), plus government transfers, g, must  equal 
second-period consumption. 
Let us now turn to the impact on steady-state utility] of a change in 
r, the domestic interest rate. By equations (2)  and (3): 
(4)  c2  = y* + (I + r)(v’ - el) + g. 
Thus, if  the original  solution is interior  (an assumption that will  be 
maintained throughout), and if the “envelope theorem” (see  Takayama 
1974) is applied: 
(5)  dU/dr = (d U/dc2)[dc2/dr + (dc2/dg)(dgldr)l 
= (dU/dc2)(r*  - r)db/dr, 
where the partial derivatives involving c2 are supposed to be taken in 
equation (4); and dgldr is the total change of g (as defined by equation 
[I])  when  r  is increased. More intuitively,  the change in  U is  being 
evaluated by calculating the increase in welfare that would occur if the 
entire adjustment fell on c2.  This calculation yields the true variation 
in U,  because the individual is assumed to optimize, taking into account 
his budget constraint; and the implication  is that the marginal utility 
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goods. Notice that dbldr stands for the optimal response of b to both 
the change in r and the associated change in g. 
In the "normal"  case in which dbldr > 0,2  maximum steady-state 
utility is attained, by equation (51, at the point at which r = r', that is, 
when there is no control on  international capital mobility and, therefore, 
when the international and domestic interest rates are equalized. 
As can easily be shown the above result is not robust to changes in 
the allocation of g  between the young and the old. Nevertheless, the 
assumption that transfers are given only to the old is interesting,  be- 
cause it implies that in the absence of money and other imperfections, 
there should not be any interference with international capital mobility. 
The following discussion will bring money and banks into the picture 
in an examination of questions about optimal inflation and bank controls 
and then, in a framework comparable to the above, in an examination 
of the question about controls on capital mobility. 
Assume that (expected) utility  at birth  is  also a function  of  real 
monetary balances, m,3  thus making it possible to write U(c',  c2,  m). 
For concreteness, the marginal utility of money is assumed to be pos- 
itive, and function U is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave in its three 
arguments.  The  representative  individual's  budget  constraints  are 
therefore: 
(7)  y2 + b(l + r) + m(1 + T)-'  + g  = c2, 
where  T is the  steady-state, one-period  rate of  inflation.  Unlike  in 
equations (2) and (3), the individual is now allowed to hold money in 
period  1 and to use it in period 2; the output value of m in period 2 is 
thus m(l + n)-I. 
Let M, stand for the nominal  stock of money and P,  stand for the 
price level, both at time t. Seigniorage from money creation in terms 
of output then eq~als:~ 
(M,+' - M,)lP,+l = md(1 + T). 
The budget  constraint  for the government therefore implies  (recall 
equation [  11): 
(9)  (r* - r)b + md(l + T)  = g. 
Again, if  we assume interior solutions, the changes in expected utility 
caused by changes in T  and r are, by equations (6) through (9): 
(  104 
(1  Ob) 
dUldr = (r* - r)dbldr + ~(l  + .rr)-'dmldr 
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where, without losing generality, dUldc2 is set equal to one (this nor- 
malization will be used for all the following “dU”  exercises). In ad- 
dition, the following “normality” assumptions are made: 
(1la)  dbldr > 0  (1  lb)  dblda 3 0 
(1 lc)  dmldr < 0  (1  Id)  drnlda < 0. 
It follows from (10) and (1 1) that if a = 0, it would be optimal  to 
set r = r*,  as in the nonmonetary case. On the other hand, if  r = r*, 
then  it is optimal  to set a equal to zero. There is therefore a prima 
facie case for expecting r  = r’  and a = 0 to yield a global maximum. 
(See the appendix for a formal proof of the latter, T = 0, that does not 
even rely on (1  l).) 
A point of considerable theoretical  interest is that there is no pre- 
sumption here that the optimal rate of inflation should, as in Friedman’s 
rule (see Friedman 1969), be related to the market real rate of interest. 
The example here makes that absolutely  clear, since as pointed  out 
before, when there is no interest tax-which  Friedman also assumes- 
optimal inflation is ze1-0.~  Another important finding of the analysis is 
that the mere existence of money does not call for controls on capital 
mobility if the quantity of money is set optimally. If, however, a >O, 
it would not be optimal by (lOa), to set r greater than or equal to r’. 
As a result, with  positive  inflation  it  is optimal to subsidize  capital 
inflows and to tax capital outflows. In other words, in the realistic case 
in  which  inflation  is a positive  number,  net borrowing from abroad 
should be  stimulated by  subsidizing the rate of interest. This result 
may be more appealing if the reader notices that positive inflation in 
this model implies that individuals are receiving the inflation tax in the 
form of a positive lump-sum transfer during old age. Setting r slightly 
less than r* results in a negligible welfare cost because of the change 
in b (because r is very close to r*);  but since the analysis started at a 
point at which  m was significantly distant from the optimum, the as- 
sociated increase in rn (which was brought about by the lowering of r) 
has a significant positive  effect on welfare. Thus, the subsidy of the 
interest rate is optimal because of its positive effect on the demand for 
money; if money demand were totally interest inelastic, for example, 
the optimal domestic interest rate would equal the international interest 
rate. 
A more difficult question is the optimal policy  mix when the gov- 
ernment is committed to set g (government  transfers)  at a given positive 
level. The answer depends very strongly on the underlying structural 
parameters; and unfortunately, no generally valid policy rule emerges 
from the analytical apparatus employed here. 
I will now expand the model to analyze the effects of banking. To 
simplify the exposition, we will assume that there exists only one bank 183  Welfare,  Banks, and Capital Mobility in Steady State 
which, however, behaves in a competitive manner (further extensions 
are discussed in the section 5.3). This bank takes (demand) deposits 
from individuals and buys bonds yielding the domestic interest rate. 
Since we assume the costs of operating the bank  are nil  (or, if  you 
wish, negligible), and since the bank earns zero (pure) profits, we can 
conclude that if the bank holds a cash/deposits ratio equal to 6, where 
0 5 6 5 1, the gross return of deposits in terms of output, q,  satisfies: 
(12) 
The first term on the right-hand  side of the equation represents the 
yield of bonds held  per unit of deposit, while the second term is the 
yield of cash reserves per unit  of deposit. Since the bank is a profit 
maximizer and there is no uncertainty,  it will hold all of its assets in 
only one form, unless the rates of return of the two assets are equal 
(something that happens only by  accident in  the present model), or 
unless it is regulated by, for example, minimum reserve requirements. 
If we assume the latter here, as long as (I  + v) > (I + T)  I-that  is, 
as long as the return on the bond exceeds the return on cash-a  profit- 
maximizing bank will set 6 equal to the legal cash/deposits ratio. 
Let us now consider the depositors' side. For simplicity of exposi- 
tion, make the strong assumption that bank deposits are perfect sub- 
stitutes for cash (extensions to allow for imperfect substitutability are 
discussed in the section 5.3). Since, by equation (12) and the previous 
considerations, q 2 (I  + 7r)  I, individuals will find it to their advan- 
tage to hold no cash and to maintain all of their liquidity in the form 
of bank deposits.6  Thus, in the utility function m will be identified with 
(real) bank deposits in the discussion that follows. 
The budget constraint for the representative individual is now (recall 
equations [61, [71, and [121): 
(13)  y' = c'  + b + m 
(14)  y2 + h(1  + Y)  + mq + g  = c2. 
Furthermore, recalling equation (8) and that in  the present case the 
bank is the only holder of cash, we find: 
(15) 
A comparison of equations (15) and (9) shows that one innovation is 
that there are now two types of bond holders: individuals (a5 before), 
and the bank. The demand for bonds by the bank just equals the share 
of total deposits that is not kept in the form of cash balances, that is, 
(1 - 6)m. Another innovation is that the bank is now the only holder 
of cash, the demand for which thu? equals 6m. 
Let us again study the welfare implications of changing 7r and Y.  By 
methods similar to those used to specify equation (lo),  it can be verified 
q = (1 + Y)(l  - 6) + (1  + 7r)  '6. 
(Y'  -  Y)[h + (I - 6)ml + 6rnT/(l + 7r) = g. 184  Guillermo A. Calvo 
that, as in  the no-banks  situation, optimal inflation  is  zero if  r  = r' 
(that is, if  there is no tax on interest). Furthermore: 
(16)  dUldr = (r' - r)[(l - 6)dmldr 
+ dbldr] + ST(I  + ~)-'dm/dr. 
Hence, if  T = 0 and if 
(17)  (1 - 6)dmldr + dbldr > 0, 
then it is optimal to set r = r'. To understand this result better, notice 
that (1 - 6)m is the demand for bonds by the bank, and equation (17) 
therefore requires that the aggregate demand for bonds increases with 
the rate of interest. Moreover, this proposition is the natural extension 
of the one proved for the no-banks case, since when 6 =  1, that is, 
when the bank holds  100 percent reserves, equation (17) reduces to 
(1 la).' 
Of even greater interest is to study the impact of changing the min- 
imum cashideposits ratio at the bank. Suppose that (1 + T)  -  I  < (1  + r) 
so that cash yields a smaller return than bonds. As argued above, 6 
will therefore be set at the legal minimum.  Using similar methods as 
before, we find that if T = 0 and r  = r': 
(18)  dUId6 =  -mr, 
which  is  a  negative  number if  the international  real  interest  rate is 
positive (which will be assumed in what follows). Under these circum- 
stances a  lower cashldeposits ratio  is  therefore always welfare  im- 
proving.  If  there is  no technical  lower limit  on 6, (18) implies  that 
welfare is  maximized  in  a "pure  credit"  regime  according to which 
high-powered money is eliminated and bank deposits have a 100 percent 
backing in terms of bonds (or securities). 
Suppose now that the government is constrained to raise a given 
amount of  revenue. In  this case is there an optimal  combination  of 
inflation and a minimum cashldeposits ratio'? To  answer this question, 
consider an experiment in  which  6 and  n are changed  such that  q 
remains constant; clearly, by equation (12): 
(19)  [(l + T)-'  - (1 + r)]d6 - 6(1  + T)  'dT = 0. 
Recalling equations (13) and (14), we can see that a change in T  and 6 
that keeps g and q constant-and  where, therefore, equation (19) holds- 
leaves  the individual  with  exactly the  same budget  constraint. Ob- 
viously, this experiment will not result in any change of expected utility. 
What about government revenue? By equations (15) and (19): 
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Hence, if  6 is lowered-and,  thus, by  (19),  TI is raised-to  keep the 
return on deposits, q,  constant, total government revenue will tend to 
increase. Since when part of the extra revenue is given back to the 
public, expected utility will obviously increase, a rather remarkable 
proposition results, namely,  it  is  possible  to lower the cashldeposits 
ratio in such a way that expected utility and government revenue are 
both increased, even when the economy will have to suffer a perma- 
nently higher rate of  inflation. Notice that this proposition, contrary 
to most of the previous ones, does not depend on the sign of  any total 
derivative, and that it holds independent of the initial values of TI and r. 
This proposition is a local one. We cannot infer from it that 6 should 
be  set equal to zero; when  r  = r',  for example, 6 = 0 implies, by 
equation (15), that the revenue would also be zero. In general, there 
will be a (possibly positive) lower bound on 6, below (and normally 
also at) which the revenue constraint cannot be satisfied.8 The prop- 
osition suggests setting 6 as close as possible to that lower bound. 
As an important extension of the above result, it is now possible to 
prove that the above type of experiment may yield even higher welfare 
when TI 2 0 if  the extra revenue is used to bring r closer to r*,  that is, 
if  the extra revenue is accompanied by a reduction (in absolute value) 
of the interest-rate tax. To  prove the proposition, assume equation (17) 
holds and examine the region in which the revenue from the tax on 
interest, (r* - r) [b + (1 -  6)m],  is an increasing function of the tax, 
(r' -  r),  or, equivalently, the region in which: 
(21)  d{(r* - r)[b + (1 - G)m]}/dr  < 0. 
This condition would necessarily hold for some neighborhood of  r'  if 
the aggregate demand for bonds is  positive-a  highly  plausible  as- 
sumption, since bond holdings represent the net financial wealth of this 
economy outside of high-powered  money. 
Suppose that associated with the constraint on g,  there is an optimal 
choice of r given TI and 6; now, lower 6 and increase  TI as  in the previous 
experiment, momentarily returning the extra revenue to the public. By 
the previous  analysis,  this results in  larger welfare  and government 
revenue than before; thus, the constraint on g  would not be binding. 
The change in welfare when the constraint on g is not binding is given 
by  equation (16). Hence, if  r > r* we have-recalling  equations (16) 
and (17) and that, by assumption, TI 2 0-dU/dr  < 0, so that the op- 
timal r will shift down toward  r'.  Suppose now that r < r'; then, by 
equations (1 lc), (15), and (211, dgldr < 0. Since the original choice of 
r is assumed to have been optimal (given r,  TI, and the constraint on 
g), it follows that dU/dr  0; for if  contrariwise (dUldr <  O), the ex- 
pected utility and revenue could be made larger by further lowering r, 
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curately, given the “weak”  inequality above, it would not be inopti- 
mal-(once  the constraint on g  is  relaxed) to increase r  toward  r*, 
proving the proposition. 
The intuition  surrounding  this  statement is  as follows.  The local 
analysis strongly suggests the possibility that the global optimum, when 
there are no constraints on government revenue, calls for setting r  = r’ 
(the global proof is in the appendix). This equality, of course, would 
not hold  in general when g  is subject to a constraint; however,  it is 
quite clear that as the revenue constraint is relaxed, welfare increases 
and, for some nonnegligible regions, r should move toward r* (since it 
has to be equal to r* when the g  constraint is removed.) One way of 
relaxing the constraint is, as argued before, by a lowering of 6 accom- 
panied  by an appropriate increase in  r.  Hence, by the previous rea- 
soning, there should be nonnegligible regions in which the proposition 
is true. The proposition also gives a set of plausible sufficient conditions 
for the optimal r necessarily to move toward r*,  although the intuitive 
justification for those conditions is less obvious. 
In sum, this analysis has shown that the presence of a banking system 
does not, in principle, imply a modification in the optimal values of 
inflation and interest rate; moreover, when r = 0 and r  = r’, liberal- 
ization of the system (a lowering of 6) is always welfare increasing. 
This is also true if  the government is committed to raising a particular 
amount of revenue, for, as has been shown, within certain bounds a 
lower 6, accompanied by an appropriately higher r,  will result in higher 
expected utility and government revenue. Furthermore, under plausible 
conditions even higher welfare would be attained if  the tax on interest 
(in absolute value) were simultaneously reduced. In other words, the 
present framework strongly suggests that the emergence of a compet- 
itive banking system may call for a further increase of the degree of 
free capital mobility. 
5.3  Deterministic Steady State: Further Discussion and Extensions 
To contribute to the reader’s understanding of, and comfort in using, 
the previous models as analytical tools, it will be useful to check that 
certain basic relations hold as they should. For instance, by equations 
(12) through (15) it can be shown that: 
(22)  y’  + y2 + r*[b  + (1 - 6)ml = c1 + c2. 
The left-hand  side of the equation represents the GNP, because it is 
the sum of total domestic output plus the balance in the service account 
(in the brackets b denotes private bond holdings, while (I - 6)m  de- 
notes the bonds demanded by the bank). The right-hand side denotes 
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domestic absorption, a relation that necessarily  has to hold in a no- 
growth steady state. 
In the earlier, molecular scenario, the speck of land that constituted 
the country produced only purely tradable goods. An easy extension 
of that scenario is to introduce nontradables by, for example, letting 
“leisure” be a factor in the utility function and by assuming that total 
output is produced  by labor alone. Leisure would then stand for the 
nontradables, and none of the comparative statics formulas is changed, 
implying, of course, that all the earlier results carry over to this case. 
The industrious  reader may  want  to pursue the analysis further by 
studying the  impact of  the different  policies  on the  “real exchange 
rate,”  which could be defined as the inverse of the “real wage,”  that 
is, the wage rate in terms tradables. 
A blatantly unrealistic assumption of  the analysis to this point has 
been the perfect substitutability between cash and bank deposits. For- 
tunately, there is easy remedy for that. First, notice that the analysis 
does not depend on whether b, bond holdings,  is an argument in the 
utility function; the results thus hold whether bonds are “liquid”  or 
not. Now, consider the extreme case in which the legal cash/deposits 
ratio is zero and it is technically feasible for the bank to hold no cash. 
As long as cash is a less attractive asset than bonds, the profit-maximizing 
bank will then set 6 equal to zero, and by equation (12), the gross rate 
of  return on deposits, q,  will be  (1 + r), thus making  deposits and 
bonds equally attractive. Without losing generality, it can then be as- 
sumed that individuals hold no bonds, and in the no-banks version of 
the model (primarily equations [6], [7], and [9]), b can be redefined as 
deposits, and m as  real high-powered money. With this reinterpretation, 
the no-banks model can be applied to examine optimal policy in the 
context of a perfectly competitive banking system (one with zero cash 
reserves), but one in which deposits are imperfect substitutes for cash. 
Recalling the discussion in  section 5.2, we can see that if  there is no 
constraint on government  revenue, it is possible to make a plausible 
case for zero inflation and no tax on interest. As a matter of fact, that 
case can be extended to cases in which 6 is exogenous; and in addition, 
one can show, as in  section 5.2, that if  -rr  = 0 and r  = r’,  welfare 
improves as 6 is lowered. 
With imperfect cash-deposits substitutability, it is no longer true that 
when there is a constraint on government revenue, it is always welfare 
increasing to lower the cash/deposits  ratio at the cost of higher inflation. 
This is so because, although such an experiment could be done in such 
a way as not to lower the “quality” of bank money (by the arguments 
given in the previous section), there is here an additional welfare loss 
caused by the associated quality loss of cash, which is provoked by 
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substitutability  between deposits and currency would  normally  be a 
function of government regulations. Thus, a challenging open question 
is  whether it would  be optimal to ease the substitutability  between 
these two types of monetary instruments, taking into account the gov- 
ernment budget  constraint. Such an effort would probably  require a 
more detailed model, one in which the role of money is explicitly stated 
and  liquid  assets are not  introduced  simply  as factors in  the utility 
function. 
In connection with the last point, it is worth indicating that essentially 
all of the arguments made so far could be shown in terms of a model 
that does not include money in the utility function. One can, for in- 
stance, assume that money (cash or bank money) is the only savings 
instrument available in the very short run. A case could be made that 
individuals do not know their tastes when they make the bond-holding 
decision (presumably because the bond market is not open at all times), 
and as a result they carry some purchasing power into the first period 
of  their  life  without  exactly knowing their preferences. When  their 
tastes are revealed (during the first period, say), those who desire to 
transfer unspent  purchasing power to their second period are forced 
to hold money. Given the return on money, some may prefer to save 
something extra for next period, thus generating a (precautionary) de- 
mand for money. If preferences are “shocked” by identically distrib- 
uted random variables that are mutually independent across individ- 
uals,  the result  could  be a  stable demand for money  that would  be 
indistinguishable from the one derived in section 5.2 (for details on this 
model, see Calvo 1984). 
An obvious advantage of a more explicit model is that it allows a 
better understanding of the role of  the banking system. In the context 
of the case just mentioned, for example, banks would be in a position 
to take advantage of the law of large numbers; by the stochastic as- 
sumptions, the bank (again, if we assume there is only one bank) would 
be in a position to know exactly the sums that will be kept in the form 
of deposits if  it has a  very large  set of  customers. The bank  could 
therefore use those sums (more accurately, what is left of those sums 
after accounting for the required reserves against deposits) to buy bonds, 
thus generating  a  type of  money  that would  dominate cash (in the 
realistic case in which [l + rl  > [l +  TI-’). 
The model can easily be extended to allow for the existence of more 
than one bank. In this case the amount of deposits at any given bank 
will be a random variable,  but the interbank loan system may come 
into play to help replicate the solution that would be attained by one 
large competitive bank. 
In closing this section, I  should point  out that  I  have  completely 
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by Auernheimer (1974). Nonetheless, the analysis can be extended in 
that direction with no significant qualitative changes in the results. The 
next section will take account of the stock seigniorage in connection 
with the foreign demand for domestic money. 
5.4  Foreign Demand for Domestic Money 
This section presents a discussion of the possibility that a competitive 
banking system may not be optimal because it creates a potential for 
the emergence of a demand for domestic money by foreigners. It will 
thus be useful to begin by examining some of the mechanics associated 
with such a demand for money in the simplest case, one with no banks. 
Assume that the central bank announces a path of the exchange rate 
with a constant rate of devaluation and is committed (to the maximum 
extent of its capabilities) to guaranteeing full currency convertibility at 
the ruling exchange rate. Let z  indicate the demand for real domestic 
monetary balances by foreigners. Assume now that z was zero up to 
time zero and  thereafter (unless a collapse of the fixed-rates system 
is expected, as will be explained below). In the kind of scenario dis- 
cussed in the previous section, with a nonstochastic aggregate demand 
for domestic money, the central bank would be able to guarantee 100 
percent backing for foreign deposits, increase social welfare by buying 
z units of bonds, and distribute the return on the government’s bonds 
back to the public.  There is a potential  source of time inconsistency 
here (see Calvo 1978). Suppose, for instance, that I  is foreigners’ de- 
mand for domestic money when the expected rate of devaluation equals 
T.  A way  for the government to collect extra revenue would  be to 
announce a surprise devaluation, followed by a renewed promise that 
the rate of devaluation would henceforth be set equal to T.  If the policy 
was  credible,  the government would  succeed in  accumulating more 
bonds, thus increasing the amount of the transfer to domestic residents. 
This is not the type of  problem I wish to emphasize here, however. To 
eliminate such “temptations” on the part of the monetary authorities, 
I  will  instead  assume that the government compensates (taxes) for- 
eigners for any depreciation  (appreciation) in  the value of  their real 
monetary balances that is caused by a surprise policy change. 
Let us now introduce the banking sector, as in section 5.2. There is 
thus a single domestic bank that is the only holder of domestic currency 
(or high-powered m~ney).~  Let Z denote the nominal value of foreign 
holdings of domestic money (deposits, in this case). The flow of seig- 
niorage based on devaluation  that accrues to the government is then 
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where z  = Z/P.  In addition, the government can collect a return (the 
rate of which is assumed to be equal to r') on the (net) bonds that had 
to be surrendered by foreigners when they acquired the domestic de- 
posits,  that is, 6zr'.  Finally,  an additional  source of  revenue is the 
interest tax on the bonds that the bank acquired with foreigners'  de- 
posits, or (r* - r)  (1 - 6)z. Thus, the flow of government revenue (in 
terms of output)  associated with the presence of foreigners in the money 
market,g*, satisfies the following: 
(24)  g'  = [(r' - r)(l - 6) + S(r* + d(1 + 7~11~. 
It readily follows from equations (12) and (24) that: 
(25)  g'  = (I + r'  - q)z, 
which states that the government's revenue associated with the pres- 
ence of foreigners in the money market is just equal to the difference 
between the return on those deposits if they were entirely invested in 
the international bond market, (I + r*)z,  and the return that accrues 
to foreigners as depositors, zq. 
Now make the plausible assumption that (given the rates of returr, 
on all the other international assets) foreigners'  demand for domestic 
deposits is  an increasing function  of the rate of  return of  domestic 
deposits, q.  That demand can be indicated by: 
(26)  z  = f(q),  f' > 0. 
It is interesting to note that the present assumptions (a key one being 
that reserves at the central bank can be kept in terms of the international 
bond-see  below for further discussion)  imply that g' is a function only 
the rate of return on deposits, q.  Given q,  the value of g" is completely 
independent of r, n, and 6. This feature will be exploited in the analyses 
to follow. 
Revenue from domestic sources still satisfies equation (15),  and the 
gross return on deposits is given by equation (12). Total government 
revenue, G, therefore satisfies the following: 
(27)  G=g+g' 
The budget constraints for the representative individual are now given 
by: 
(28)  y1 = c1 + b + rn 
(29)  y2 + b(l  + r) + rnq  + G = c2. 
In section 5.2 I  suggested very strongly (the formal proof is in the 
appendix) that in the absence of constraints on government revenue, 191  Welfare,  Banks, and Capital Mobility in Steady State 
an optimal policy would be to set 6 equal to zero and r equal to r’. By 
equation (12) this implies q =  1  + r*,  a consequence of which is, by 
equation (25),  that revenue from foreigners would be zero. But, by (25) 
and (26), at q =  1  + r’: 
(30)  dg’ldq = -81  + r’) < 0. 
Hence, revenue from foreigners would necessarily increase if  -q is set 
at slightly less than the social optimum when there is no foreign demand 
for domestic deposits. But since taking into account only the domestic 
variables  (everything but  g*), when 6 = 0 and r  = r’, we have  dU/ 
dq = 0 (the first-order condition for maximum), it follows, by equa- 
tions (28) through (30), that when there is a positive foreign demand 
for domestic deposits, it is optimal to set q < 1  + r’. 
Letij < 1  + r* be the optimum level of q.  A reasoning similar to the 
one given in section 5.2 (particularly the discussion around equation 
[20]) shows that if 6 > 0, that is, if  there is a nonzero minimum cash/ 
deposits ratio, and if  T <  00,  welfare and government revenue are in- 
creased by lowering 6 and increasing the rate of devaluation  (or rate 
of inflation, T)  in such a way as  to keep q = ij.  The previous reasoning 
can be applied directly because, by equations (26) and (27), the revenue 
from foreign holdings of domestic deposits is not being changed by this 
experiment. 
Consequently, the presence of a stable foreign demand for domestic 
deposits offers no new reason against banking liberalization. This is an 
interesting result  because it might appear natural to think that a sig- 
nificantly  positive  cash/deposits ratio  would  be the optimal  way  to 
collect the seigniorage from foreigners. The analysis has instead shown 
that the country is always in a better position by collecting the same 
amount of revenue from foreigners by lowering 6, while at the same 
time increasing the rate of devaluation (equal to the rate of inflation.) 
It can easily be shown that the same qualitative result holds even when 
there is a constraint on government revenue. 
Up to this point, the analysis has completely ignored the presence 
of aggregate random shocks. This assumption will now be relaxed with 
respect to z,  namely, foreigners’ demand for domestic money. The main 
objective here is to gain some insight into situations in which the de- 
mand for domestic money that originates abroad is significantly more 
volatile  than  that generated by domestic residents. This may be the 
case, in particular, when foreigners consider the home country’s do- 
mestic money to be essentially like any other (almost)  pure asset, while 
the country’s residents, because they use domestic money for trans- 
action purposes, are more appreciative of the “liquidity  services” that 
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in  the previous  section, one could  argue  that domestic demand for 
money is relatively stable and unaffected by random shocks on the rate 
of return of competing assets. 
Consider,  first,  the case without  banks. If  the central  bank  could 
invest the equivalent of z  in  the form of  international bonds and still 
maintain  the liquidity necessary in case of a random reduction  of z, 
then all that was found in the previous cases applies here as well. But 
the central bank should normally be subject to transactions constraints. 
If, as  in the scenario in the previous section, individuals have a positive 
demand for domestic money because, say, the bond market  was not 
open at all times; under these circumstances, it seems quite natural to 
assume that somewhat similar constraints also apply to the central bank 
and that it therefore will normally  be led to keep some liquid  funds 
(yielding an interest rate less than r') as insurance against a random 
shrinkage of z.  I am not interested here in providing a complete theory 
about the optimal insurance of this type; it is clear, however, that to 
the extent that the government does not intend to default with a prob- 
ability of one, it will keep some funds in liquid form. This implies that 
the rate of return on z realized by the central bank is likely to be smaller 
than the previous analysis would indicate. 
Whether this  scenario calls for a higher  or lower optimal rate of 
inflation cannot be answered in general. Thus, to sharpen our intuition, 
let us assume that no foreign demand for domestic money will arise 
unless the central bank holds its reserves in the form of assets yielding 
a zero rate of return, in which case z  would become nonrandom, as 
before. In this case the seigniorage associated with foreign demand is 
TTZ and  not  (r'  + TT)~,  as before.  If  the domestic economy could  be 
isolated from the TT that applies to foreigners, and if  we examine the 
region in which the foreign demand for domestic money has an elasticity 
smaller than one, then the optimal TT will tend to be larger than before 
(that is, when the central bank invested these funds in terms of inter- 
national  bonds, yielding  r'  > 0'"). When  this  fact is  combined  with 
domestic considerations, it is likely that the unconstrained optimal rate 
of devaluation will be larger than before, while the optimal r might be 
smaller than before. Since a higher  TT means that smaller amounts of 
foreign funds will be channeled to the home country, the end result of 
the policy will tend to be a smaller injow of foreign capital in search 
of domestic money. 
The presence of the banking system may help improve welfare even 
further if  deposits by foreigners  can be distinguished from those by 
residents. In the case in which deposits are perfect substitutes for cash, 
it can easily be  shown that maximum welfare could be achieved  by 
disallowing foreigners to hold  domestic deposits and by  setting up a 
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The rate of devaluation (equal to the rate of inflation) would then be 
set at the point at which 7~z  is maximized  (remember that to be able 
to attract z  the central bank is assumed to be forced to hold  assets 
yielding a zero rate of return). 
This separation of domestic residents and foreigners for the purpose 
of collecting an inflation tax is, however, not very likely to be feasible 
in practice, given the various ways that individuals can find to hide their 
identities. Hence, it is interesting to examine the opposite case, one in 
which foreigners qua depositors are indistinguishable from domestic 
residents. Let us study the case in which the domestic banking system 
is completely free (that is, 6 = 0 and r  = r*)  and there is therefore no 
demand for the domestic currency. Suppose, again, that z units of for- 
eign deposits are attracted by the domestic banking system, and that in 
order to make their deposits at the bank, foreigners first have to ex- 
change foreign currency for domestic  currency and second have to make 
the deposit at the bank. The bank, not having any need or desire to hold 
domestic currency, takes the domestic currency back to the central bank, 
exchanges it for foreign currency, and buys bonds yielding a rate of re- 
turn equal to r'. The country realizes no gain or loss by this sequence 
of operations; but the above-mentioned  operation is simply infeasible 
because foreigners are assumed to require that the institution whose li- 
abilities they hold should have equally valued reserves in terms of some 
zero-interest asset. If the bank makes it perfectly clear that it is not going 
to acquire any zero-interest assets, no foreigner will want to deposit at 
the bank, that is, z will be zero. In this case, the banking system would 
be incompatible with this type of international capital mobility, even when 
that mobility is unfettered by any form of regulation. 
On the other hand, if  the central bank would like to attract foreign 
funds while keeping a perfectly free banking system, it will be forced 
to offer some kind of deposit insurance. Suppose that deposits are fully 
insured  by  the central  bank. For z  to be positive, the central bank 
would clearly have to hold  an amount z  of zero-interest  bonds. This 
would represent a revenue loss of r'z; and since domestic currency 
would not be held  (directly or indirectly) by foreigners, the result of 
this operation could not be anything but a welfare loss. An implication 
of this analysis is that to extract positive seigniorage from foreigners 
when their identities are totally unknown, the central bank must intro- 
duce distortions in the domestic banking system. 
In general, when 6 is not constrained to be zero, as above, and when 
r f r* (recall equation [25]): 
(31) 
where r'z has been subtracted from the right-hand side of equation (25) 
to account for the revenue lost in order to be able to offer 100 percent 
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backing. It thus follows from (3  1) that a necessary condition for  foreign 
deposits to improve  welfare is  that  the  (net) real  rate  of  return  on 
deposits (q -  1) be negative. Notice that in the extreme case in which 
the banking system is totally free-that  is, the case examined in the 
previous paragraph-g’  =  -r*z < 0, as argued before. 
An important point to keep in mind is that with no foreign partici- 
pation  in the banking system of the type discussed above, we have 
found strong indications that the optimal solution would be free banking 
and  no  interference  with  international  capital  mobility,  implying 
q = 1 + r’  (which was assumed to be greater than unity). On the other 
hand, with deposit insurance and 100 percent backing with zero-interest 
bonds, foreign holding of  deposits will  be welfare-increasing only if 
q - 1 < 0, independent  of  how  small  z (> 0) happens  to be. It  is 
therefore quite clear that under these circumstances it could only be 
optimal to allow foreigners to hold domestic deposits if  it were possible 
to attract  suf$ciently  large  sums for this purpose, that is, if  z  were 
sufficiently large. And, in any case, the business of attracting z-type 
funds would call for a possibly substantial departure from the policy 
that would be first best if  z  = 0. 
It is interesting  to note that  since, by  equations  (26) and (31), g’ 
depends only on q,  welfare again is improved by a lowering of  6 ac- 
companied by an increase of  IT  that leaves q unchanged (again here, 
however, the limit at which IT  = 00  is not well defined.) Thus, although 
the presence of unidentifiable foreign depositors may call for a major 
interference with the banking system, it is still true that a lower cash/ 
deposits ratio will improve welfare even when it may call for a sub- 
stantial increase in the rate of inflation. 
At a deeper level, it is still necessary to explain the rationale for the 
100 percent backing requirement that was assumed in the above dis- 
cussion. Although it is not my purpose to give a full coverage of this 
issue here, some pertinent remarks may be in order. In a more realistic 
situation, z is likely to be stochastic; the backing of foreigners’ deposits 
would therefore be a way of  guaranteeing the international value of 
deposits. We  can think of  the case discussed above as one in which 
foreigners are “maximiners” who think only of the worst possible event 
and one in which all foreign investors would decide to withdraw their 
funds from the country at the same time, leading to a total loss of value 
if  there were no 100 percent backing. Thus, if  there were no “true” 
stochastic shocks on z,  such a backing would remove the foreign inves- 
tors’ anxieties and the economy would be able peacefully to write its 
own history along a nonstochastic steady state (as in the case examined 
above). 
From the point of  view of  the foreign investor, it does not really 
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of z. We  have assumed that someone in the tiny economy should pay 
for the resulting liquidity cost (if any foreign investor is going to be 
attracted), but there are other options. A very obvious one is for the 
central bank to become a member of some international banking system 
having the power to issue “international”  money. Thus, if  the small 
country’s currency is pegged to, say, the U.S. dollar, a way to attract 
foreign investment would be for the central bank (more accurately, the 
local banking system) to become a member of the Federal Reserve 
System and the Federal  Deposit Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC). In 
situations like these, the backing would be automatically provided by 
the international system. This kind of arrangement is not necessarily 
costless, however; the local banking system would now be subject to 
the regulations applying to the international one. 
Another way to reduce the cost of backing the currency would be 
to allow “international”  banks to operate in the home country. This 
would reduce the need for explicit backing if  it is well understood by 
the public that in case of, for example, a bank run, the subsidiaries of 
“international” banks will be bailed out by their respective headquarters. 
5.5  Summary 
The basic argument made in this paper has been that the presence 
of a stable foreign demand for domestic money is not a reason to dismiss 
efforts to liberalize the banking system. On the other hand, if foreigners’ 
demand for domestic money  is  either random or a function of  the 
liquidity of, for example, the central bank’s assets, the cost of attracting 
foreign funds into a relatively liberalized banking system may be sig- 
nificant. Thus, an optimal arrangement may call for an important re- 
duction of the rate of return of bank deposits. The analysis presented 
here has also  suggested that a possible  way to reduce the costs of 
foreign demand for domestic money is to have the domestic banking 
system become a member  of  some international system or to allow 
international banks to operate in the home country. 
Appendix 
This  appendix will  demonstrate that the first-best  global optimality 
results can be obtained in a rather general and direct way. This alter- 
native proof will also help illuminate the reason for not associating the 
optimal rate of inflation with a zero nominal interest rate, as in Friedman 
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Consider the most general model discussed in the text, in which there 
is no foreign demand for domestic money, namely, the model described 
in equations (12) to (15). Let us examine the position of a planner who 
wishes to maximize expected utility (at birth) subject to the constraints 
mentioned in the text. After some simple manipulations, the following 
planner’s constraints can be derived: 
(A])  y2 - c2 + (y’ - cI)(l + r’) - Smr’  = 0. 
On the other hand, by equations (12) to (14), the budget constraint for 
the individual can be expressed as follows: 
(A2)  y2 - c2 + (y’ - cl)(l + r) 
+ Sm[(l  +  IT)-^ -  (I + r)] + g  = 0. 
Consequently, given 6, the first-order conditions for the planner and 
for the representative individual will be the same if r = r’  and 7~ = 0. 
In addition, the value of g that is incorporated in the planner’s con- 
straint (Al)  is given by equation (15), which is exactly the same expres- 
sion as that which determines g in (A2). A result of that equivalence 
is that the optimum for the planner is on the budget constraint of the 
representative individual, and furthermore, when r = r* and IT  = 0, it 
satisfies the representative individual’s  first-order conditions. Given 
the strict quasi-concavity of the utility function, the planner’s optimum 
is therefore unique and decentralizable by choosing r = r’  and IT  = 0. 
In addition, it is quite clear from equation (Al) that expected utility 
(at birth) increases as  S decreases, that is, as the minimum cash/deposit 
ratio is being decreased. These are in essence the first-best propositions 
derived in the text. 
To  understand more clearly the reason for the novel result for the 
optimal quantity of money found here, let us examine the simple no- 
bank case, which is equivalent to setting 6 equal to one. It follows from 
(Al)  that the marginal cost in terms of second-period consumption, c2, 
of an extra unit of real  monetary balances  is r*. Thus, to the extent 
that r’f  0, it will not be optimal to set dU/dm equal to zero, the “full 
liquidity”  or Friedman’s point. This is so because although the rep- 
resentative individual is being compensated for the inflation tax, there 
are not mechanisms in the model through which he could be compen- 
sated for the interest income lost when he accumulates an extra unit 
of real monetary balances.” 
One can now readily  understand why banks can improve welfare 
over the level attained without banks: they are a device by which bonds 
become more “liquid,”  or more like money, and in addition, the extra 
liquidity produced in that way does not have an opportunity cost for 
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Obviously, in this simple world the central authorities can generate 
the same welfare as in the pure credit situation (that is, when S  = 0), 
for example, by “monetizing”  bonds-allowing  them to be used as a 
means of exchange. In more realistic situations,  however, ones in which 
ascertaining the “quality”  of bonds requires  specialized skills, bond 
monetization would imply some kind of intermediation.  Thus, in the 
final analysis the central authorities would be operating very much like 
a regular banking system. 
Of greater interest is to examine the implications of paying interest 
on bank reserves.I2 Imagine the bank scenario of section 5.2, except 
now the central bank pays a nominal interest i on bank reserves (re- 
member that in such a world all cash is held in banks’ vaults.) One can 
easily verify that equations (12) and (15) are now transformed into: 
(A3)  q = (1  + r)(l - 6)  + S(l + i)/(l  + IT) 
(A4)  g  = (r’ - r)[b + (1 - S)m] + S~(IT  - i)/(l + IT) 
Hence, by equations (13), (14), (A3), and (A4), the budget constraint 
faced by the planner is still given by (Al).  The global optimum therefore 
remains the same, implying that there cannot be a welfare gain over 
the situation, discussed earlier, in which no interest is paid on reserves. 
It is, however, of some interest to explore the additional possibilities 
opened by the existence of i. This can be done, as before, by obtaining 
the expression corresponding  to (A2), when (A3), instead of (12), holds, 
such that: 
(AS)  y2 -  C*  + (y‘ -  ~‘)(l  + Y) 
+ Sm[(l  + i)/(l  + IT) -  (1 + r)] + g  = 0. 
It is now quite straightforward to argue that the optimum can be de- 
centralized by setting r equal to r* and i equal to IT. Paying interest on 
banks’ reserves could therefore be useful in  situations in which, for 
reasons outside the model, it is not possible to set IT  equal to zero. 
Notes 
1.  Focusing on steady-state utility,  of course, abstracts completely from the transi- 
tional  aspects of  policy.  This is  one reason why  “time  inconsistency”  will not be a 
problem here. 
2.  As a matter of  fact, the sign of this derivative is necessarily positive because in 
the present context it is a pure substitution effect. 
3. This is a shortcut; for a more satisfactory way of modeling money that bears the 
flavor of the present approach, see Calvo (1984). 
4. The following expression assumes equilibrium in the money market and that for- 
eigners do not demand domestic money. That they do not is another reason why “time 198  Guillermo A. Calvo 
inconsistency” is not of concern here (see Calvo 1978). Extensions of the model to cover 
this case are discussed in section 5.4. 
5. There is some superficial resemblance between this result and those in, for  example, 
Phelps (1974) and Helpman and Sadka (1979); however, their “anti-Friedman”  propo- 
sitions, unlike the ones here, depend on the assumption that lump-sum taxation is un- 
available. See the appendix for a further clarification of this issue. 
6.  When q = (1  + P)-’,  individuals are indifferent to the choice between deposits 
and cash. To simplify the exposition, assume that they still prefer deposits to cash. 
7. See the appendix for a global proof that does not rely on equations (1 1) and (17). 
8.  Revenue at the lower bound for 6  could very well be smaller than that required by 
the g constraint, in which case there is, technically speaking, no solution to the maximum 
welfare problem. Nonetheless, maximum welfare can be approached as closely as desired 
by setting 6 sufficiently close to the lower bound. 
9.  See Mundell (1972) for an early example along the following lines. 
10. For a related result see Auernheimer (1974). 
11. Related examples are in Woodford (1983), Abel (1984), and Calvo (1984). A fore- 
runner in this literature was Weiss (198Oh-a paper unknown to me until the final stages 
of this paper-in  which the zero-inflation proposition is proved for the case of  the utility 
function being separable in its three arguments. Except for my earlier paper (Calvo 1984). 
however, no other research seems to have introduced banks into this kind of scenario. 
12. The following was inspired by a question posed by Pentti Kouri. 
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Comment  Mario I. Blejer 
I find this  paper  a valuable  addition to the by  now quite extensive 
literature on the macroeconomic effects of predetermined or prean- 
nounced exchange rates. The main contribution of the paper is to ex- 
tend the preannouncement model to consider the role played by finan- 
cial intermediaries and, more important, to analyze the optimality of 
a number of policies when some constraints are imposed on the system. 
The formal analysis is very carefully elaborated and the conclusions 
reached are strong, given the assumptions made. I do think, however, 
that some of the assumptions, as well as the nature of the framework 
adopted, are rather limiting for the purpose of evaluating the impli- 
cations of preannouncing the exchange rate path or of liberalizing cap- 
ital flows. I will mention some of the issues that could be considered 
to shed light on additional aspects of the topic, although, clearly, they 
will tend to complicate the structure of the model. 
In the first place, I think that a clear limitation of the paper is the 
absence of any direct consideration of the role of risk in the model. 
An interesting discussion is provided about the need to hold “liquid 
reserves”  in order to assure that the liabilities of the banks and the 
home country would indeed be honored, but one misses a direct treat- 
ment of  risk factors in the determination of the rates of returns. The 
author, for example, that in the absence of controls on international 
capital mobility, domestic and foreign interest rates are fully equalized. 
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But endogenous risk factors clearly tend to introduce a wedge between 
those rates, afact that may change some of the subsequent conclusions. 
In addition to risk factors, domestic and foreign rates may also differ 
if, even in the absence of capital controls, foreign banks are not allowed 
to operate in  the domestic markets and if  there are technological dif- 
ferences in the operations of financial institutions across countries (a 
factor observed to prevail in many circumstances). In such cases, the 
real return to capital in the financial sector will differ, and the absence 
of capital controls will not necessarily lead to interest rate equalization. 
Calvo suggests that allowing the entry of foreign banks may reduce the 
need for “liquidity backing”  of foreign depositors. I would think that 
preventing their entry would actually result in less than perfect capital 
mobility and that some of the results may not emerge in the same form. 
In general, the concept of liberalization used is quite narrow, allowing 
for no capital controls or reserve requirements. Still, many regulatory 
elements  may  remain  that  will  tend  to prevent  full  capital  market 
integration. 
An additional subject that is not considered is the role of expectations 
in the specification of some of the central functions of the model. After 
all, the justification for the use of predetermined exchange rates was 
not only to attract foreign deposits and gain seignorage, but also to 
stabilize expectations and help in the process of integrating domestic 
and foreign markets. In general, the omission of a detailed treatment 
of risk and expectations, though making the model neat, raises other 
types of questions, such as what is the mechanism preventing infinite 
capital flows. 
On a rather specific point, I would think that a more symmetrical 
treatment calls for allowing domestic residents to hold foreign deposits 
(since foreigners are allowed to hold domestic deposits). Having a richer 
menu of  assets entering the portfolios  of  domestic residents  would 
result in  less restrictive signs for the partial  derivative in  equations 
(1 la) through (1 Id). For example, (1  lb) implies that the demand for 
real bonds increases with the rate of inflation ([dbld~]  z-  0). That is not 
a necessary result, since there are many considerations that would lead 
to the opposite outcome. It all depends on the nature of the bonds and 
on the other assets available. 
These considerations aside, I think the paper is certainly very useful 
to evaluate the welfare implications of alternative sets of liberalization 
and exchange rate rules. 